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The fiscal difficulties of LDC's, and the important role for evasion as a part of them, are well-
known. Drawing on the rich literature on tax evasion in the public finance literature1, much recent
research has shed light on two phenomena contributing to this problem: Fiscal corruption and evasion
through illegal transactions. This note surveys some of this recent research2.
The Measurement of Evasion.
First, a note on measurement may be helpful. The extent of evasion in general in many LDC's
is staggering, and yet the measurement of it has naturally always been extremely unsatisfying. The
major techniques for estimation have not changed a great deal since the summary by Cowell (1990,
Ch.2), and include, aside from survey methods, 'Gap' approaches and monetary approaches. In the
'Gap' approach (I take the term from Aim et. al., (1991)), an aggregate measure of tax obligation
is formed from the tax code and an estimate of the tax base, and this is compared with the actual tax
receipts3. Das-Gupta, Lahiri and Mookherjee (1995) use this on a time series of Indian national
accounts data, finding that income tax receipts would rise by at least 75% if improvements in
compliance measures were made (Table 3). Mehta (1990) uses similar techniques to study state tax
evasion in India. The monetary method begins from the presumption that illegal transactions are
beginning with Srinivasan (1973) and Allingham and Sandmo (1972). Cowell (1990)
provides a highly readable survey.
2This is not meant to be an exhaustive survey. It is meant to draw attention very succinctly to
some pieces of research of the last five years or so that I have found to be especially instructive,
and especially relevant to LDC's; for the inevitable good pieces that I will have overlooked, I
offer my many apologies in advance.
3The 'reconciliation' technique for estimating smuggling, pioneered by Bhagwati and exploited
in case studies in Bhagwati (1974), might be thought of as a special case of this broad class. See
Connolly, Devereux, and Cortes (1995) for a recent application.
2conducted in cash only, so a measure of cash transactions might provide an estimate of undeclared
income. Making a series of assumptions about the constancy of money velocity across sectors and
the initial level of undeclared income, such studies use data on aggregate cash stocks to estimate the
volume of illegal transactions. An example is Polyconomics (1990), which using this technique
estimates that 25 to 50% of the Mexican economy is off the books. Similarly, Bagachwa and Naho
(1995) estimate the fraction for Tanzania as having grown from below 10% to above 30% over the
independence period.
Aim, Bahl and Murray (1991) give us what are probably the best measurements we have of
tax evasion (and also legal tax avoidance) in an LDC. This study uses detailed data on tax returns
in Jamaica and combines it with survey data. The authors draw two random samples of tax returns,
one from self-employed taxpayers and one from 'pay-as-you-earn' (PAYE) taxpayers, or employees
subject to withholding. The former sample is combined with survey data on the self-employed to
identify the degree of non-filing among that group, and with audit data to identify the determinants
and extent of underreporting in the group. The latter sample is combined with survey data to estimate
the determinants of'allowances' as a share of total income for individual employees; these are cash
supplements for specific purposes that are de jure taxable but de facto untaxed, hence a form of legal
avoidance. The authors find that total revenue losses from these sources amount to 84% of the
revenue collected, and that the majority of this revenue is lost through the very widespread non-filing
of the self-employed, only a small minority of whom file any tax return at all. Further, understatement
of income and the use of'allowances' both respond positively to the marginal tax rate, and the overall
pattern of tax evasion substantially reduces the progressivity of the tax system. A study of this level
of detail will not be feasible very often (partly because of the possessiveness of tax offices regarding
3their records), but the richness of the information revealed shows that when it is, the payoff can be
enormous.
Fiscal corruption.
There has been considerable interest recently in corruption as a problem in the provision of
public goods and as a possible constraint on growth4. Here we will review some recent work in the
sub-branch of this area related to the tax problem.
The theoretical approaches to corruption in tax collections can be placed roughly in two
categories. The more familiar one (at least in the economics literature) portrays fiscal corruption as
a constraint on the government, requiring it to consider the principal-agent problem of enforcing tax
obligations through a staff of potentially corruptible inspectors. The pioneering analysis in this line
by Virmani (1987) analyzed the incentive effects of various policy controls in the presence of possible
corruption, and argued that the analysis of compliance incentives is greatly changed by the possibility
of bribery; for example, a rise in penalties for tax evasion may easily result in a drastic drop in tax
revenues, since it will make it relatively profitable for the tax inspector and tax payer to incur the risks
of striking a bargain. An analysis in a similar spirit arises with a simpler model in Goswami, Gang and
Sanyal (1991); for example, if the number of tax inspectors willing to take bribes is increased by an
increase in the tax rate, then corruption can easily generate 'Laffer curve' type effects, in which
revenues drop when the rate rises. In both cases the model is set up so that these effects could not
4Among the recent work in this broad area are Banerjee (1993), Mauro (1995), Shleifer and
Vishny (1993), and Tanzi (1995).
4arise with uncorruptible inspectors.
Some more recent papers have emphasized the question of remuneration of tax inspectors in
the presence of corruption, an important matter because the discussion of corruption in practice often
focusses on proposals for curing it with salary increases to the civil service. A paper that carries a
lot of insight into this problem is Mookerjee and Png (1995). This paper studies the optimal
incentive arrangement for a bureaucracy in which a pollution inspector must monitor a firm for
compliance with pollution regulations, but the insights can be applied directly to the LDC fiscal
problem. The argument that follows is valid if the word 'compliance' is taken to mean compliance
with the tax code instead of with pollution regulations. The goal of the policy in the model is to get
the firm to undertake costly actions to reduce its pollution output. If it does not and the inspector
catches it, it is subject to a fine per unit of pollution generated. The problem for the government is
that the inspector is difficult to control, along two dimensions. First, he may, on finding pollution,
fail to report and offer to take a bribe instead. Second, he may simply not work very hard to find
violations. The inspector can increase the probability of catching a violating firm by working harder
at inspections, but this is costly to him. The government may, with some probability, catch the
inspector in the act of taking a bribe, and can fire him in that case; but the government cannot observe
how hard he is working, and so must structure his incentives to elicit the right amount of effort.
In this setting, the firm chooses its level of compliance with the regulation; simultaneously,
the inspector chooses his level of effort; if the latter catches the former's violation, the inspector
reports it, causing the firm to be fined, and receiving a fraction of the fine as a commission, unless it
is more profitable to collude with the firm, reporting no violation, and splitting the savings with the
firm. If collusion occurs, there is some probability that it will be discovered, an extra fine charged
5to the firm, and the inspector fired. It is clear in this setting that a rise in civil service compensation
can have a perverse effect on civil service performance, if corruption is occurring in equilibrium. A
rise in the inspector's salary is like a rise in his fine for bribery, since that is what he will lose if he is
caught and fired. Thus, a rise in his salary makes it less profitable, in expectation, to take a bribe; but
in an equilibrium with corruption, unless the salary goes up far enough to make the inspector give up
on bribery altogether, the bribe is his return to effort; thus, his inspection effort rationally drops.
Paying a corrupt civil servant high wages actually induces sloth. It may either raise or lower firm
compliance; if the inspector does catch a violation, he will require a higher bribe, to compensate him
for the higher risk; but because he is not trying very hard, it is less likely that he will catch a violation.
The net effect on the firm's incentives are thus ambiguous.
Using similar reasoning, Mookherjee and Png show that a rise in the commission rate
unambiguously increases firm compliance5. Pushing this reasoning farther, the authors show that in
their model the optimal policy is either a commission rate of 100% (or, privatization of the inspection
service); or abandoning enforcement. In the case of taxation, the former option would amount to 'tax
farming,' which has its historical precedents but is not widely thought to be a realistic option because
of legal problems it creates; and the second is equivalent to shutting down the government. Neither
extreme is very appealing in practice, but the point that has been made about the limits of pure wage
solutions is made clearly and is an important one.
Another approach to these questions is found in Besley and McLaren (1993). That paper
focusses on the optimal inspector wage problem in the presence of corruption. The problem of
5It increases the inspector's incentive to monitor for a given expected firm compliance level;
and for a given inspector monitoring effort and firm compliance level, it raises the expected bribe
the firm would have to pay. Both effects make compliance more attractive.
6inspector effort is assumed away, but there is an additional complication for the government:
Although tax inspectors may have an incentive to collude with tax payers to conceal taxable income,
not all potential tax inspectors have the inclination. Some may well be predisposed to honesty, and
unwilling to accept a bribe at any price; ideally, the government would like to hire only these, but ex
ante it can not distinguish between them and the corruptible ones. Thus, the government faces not
only the moral hazard problem that is the focus of most papers in the area, but also an adverse
selection problem, which can be parameterized by the fraction of potential inspectors who are
corruptible in the pool from which the government hires. Call this fraction y\ it could be thought of
as positively correlated with the degree of cynicism with government and negatively with a well-
entrenched ethic of loyalty and honesty within the civil service.
Assume that there is a probability, q, that an act of bribery will go undetected, and that when
bribery is detected it results in firing. The parameter q can be thought of as negatively correlated with
the sophistication of accounting procedures and information management in the civil service. Then
there are three possible values for the optimal wage. First, there is a minimum value for the
inspector's wage, called the 'efficiency wage', at which it will not be worthwhile for a corruptible
inspector to accept a bribe. This must be strictly above the wage the inspector could receive in her
next-best alternative occupation, which we can call the 'reservation wage'; further, the efficiency
wage premium must be an increasing function of q. If tax inspectors are paid the efficiency wage,
they all refuse bribes, and all taxes owed are collected; if they are paid the reservation wage, the
corruptible ones always take bribes, but a fraction (1-q) of the time they are caught and replaced,
with the evaded taxes recovered by the government. Clearly, the optimal wage would never be
above the efficiency wage, or between that and the reservation wage. Finally, it is conceivable that
7the optimal wage could be below the reservation wage, since at least the corruptible potential
inspectors are willing to work for less than their opportunity wage, knowing that they will be able to
make additional income from bribery. Call the wage at which corruptible inspectors will just make
their opportunity income when bribery is taken into account, the 'capitulation wage;' if the
government pays this it is giving in to the problem of bribery altogether, since it will be accepting an
entirely dishonest workforce that will be accepting bribes all of the time. In this case it will collect
revenues only when it catches bribery in action, or (1 -q) of the time.
It turns out that each of these three wage levels can be optimal under different circumstances.
If y is small, the reservation wage is optimal, since it would not be worth paying a premium to all
inspectors just to motivate honest behaviour in a tiny minority of them, and it is not worth
economizing on the wage by paying less than the reservation wage if that will convert an almost
entirely honest inspector force into an entirely dishonest one. If y is large and q is small, the premium
required for the efficiency wage is small, and with a largely corruptible workforce it is worth paying.
Thus, efficiency wages are optimal. However, if y and q are both large, efficiency wages are too
expensive to be attractive, and paying reservation wages would simply allow most of the inspector
force to enjoy bribery rents most of the time at the government's expense. The government might
as well lower their wages to reclaim those rents; thus, capitulation wages become optimal.
This model may help to explain some observations about tax administration. Wages paid to
civil servants in general and to tax officers in particular well below opportunity incomes appear to be
common in many countries with weak administration and widespread corruption. This appears to be
the case in many countries in Africa and also in Indonesia, at least before the dramatic public sector
reforms of the 1980's. For example, a 1977 survey by Simanjuntak (1979) of college graduates in
8Indonesia seeking jobs found that 96.8% preferred jobs in the civil service to all other forms of
employment; but the starting salaries on the civil service scale wold be at most 30% of the minimum
income they claimed would accept for their first job. The author interpreted the discrepancy to be
bribery rents that were common knowledge at the time.
Despite the growing theoretical literature on optimal incentives in the presence of fiscal
corruption, necessarily empirical work in this area is very difficult. There might be some scope for
cross-country techniques of the type pioneered by Mauro (1995), but surely for these questions the
case-study approach is the most hopeful. Examples of this include the interesting informal study of
the Indonesian reforms in Gillis (1989), in which inspector incentives had an important role; the
Philippine case highlighted by Klitgaard (1988); and the statistical study of the public sector
retrenchment in Guinea by Mills and Sahn (1995). By far the most compelling study so far of
incentive effects on tax officers is the case study by Kahn and Silva (1996) of the 1989 reforms in the
Brazilian tax collection office, the Secretaria da Receita Federal. The reforms had many components,
including changes in the tax code, but the portion of greatest interest to the authors is the bonus for
the recovery of delinquent taxes, or RAV, that was instituted in that year. The RAV had two
components: a bonus based on the individual tax officer's performance, and a bonus based on that
officer's group performance. Both were subject to ceilings that were likely to bind for many officers,
so that they would likely not have an incentive effect for the most successful tax officers, but rather
for those with the most difficult assignments or those in the regions of the country where audit costs
are higher. The data show that (i) there was a very large reallocation of tax officers away from lower-
yield types of audit, toward higher-yield types; (ii) there was a small overall decline in yield per audit
hour; and (iii) this drop was the largest in those types of audits and in those regions in which the yield
was the highest initially. Although it may be possible to tell other stories as well, (i) is consistent with
improved district-level managerial incentives resulting from the group portion of the RAV; (ii) is
consistent with an overall rise in taxpayer compliance, resulting from a perception that tax officers
now have an enhanced incentive to find (and report) violations; and (iii) is consistent with the RAV
having had a stronger incentive effect in the lower yield areas due to the ceiling. Thus, the study
offers intriguing (if not conclusive) evidence of incentive effects, in the Brazilian case, of the sort one
might hope for.
Alongside the above papers, which as noted above treat fiscal corruption as a constraint on
government, there is a very interesting contrarian strain that regards such graft as a tool of
government, or even, in some cases, as the point of government. An example from the political
literature isBoone (1994), who points out that in some cases a tax system with widespread evasion
through graft can be useful in maintaining political control. For example, particularly in the late
1980's, graft in the Ivory Coast helped to transfer a substantial amount of income to functionaries
of the ruling party through control of the bureaucracy, and in addition its very illegality was useful
because it provided a threat to expose the corruption of any participant who subsequently turned out
to be disloyal to the president. It thus provided, at the discretion of the ruling party, both a carrot
and a stick to keep political clients in line.
In the economics literature, Marcouiller and Young (1995) provide an elegant formalization
of the 'predatory state,' whose goal — far from maximizing the utility of a representative taxpayer —
is to maximize graft. Clearly, they have in mind a kleptocracy quite protected from public pressure,
and unfortunately it is not difficult to think of examples rather like that. The paradigm they use is of
a government that provides 'order,'or public services such as the enforcement of contracts and
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private property, which permit the 'formal sector' of the economy to operate. This sector is taxed,
which is the government's purpose in providing these services; the tax then can be appropriated by
government employees through graft. The total graft is assumed to be given by tax revenues minus
the cost of providing order (or, the 'profit' of the government). Any citizen who does not wish to
participate can produce output without benefit of the government's services, or in other words, in the
'informal sector.' Such production is inherently less productive, since additional resources must be
used to provide for private protection of property and similar needs; the advantage to the informal
sector is that it is not taxed. Thus, there is a sense in which the government must 'compete' with the
informal sector for workers; it must wonder whether or not by charging a price too high or by
providing public services insufficiently it may drive all the workers to the informal sector and have
no one left to tax and extort. Thus, one may hope that the predatory inclinations of the predatory
state may be substantially restrained by the presence of the informal sector.
Surprisingly, it turns out that even in competition with the informal sector, for a wide range
of parameter values, the predatory government still will squeeze the formal sector mercilessly, in the
sense of raising the tax rate without limit or decreasing the level of public services almost to zero.
Roughly, consider two cases. If the output of the informal sector is a poor substitute for the output
of the formal sector, in general equilibrium a given rise in the tax rate on the formal sector will always
increase graft, because, perversely, it will increase the tax base by drawing workers in from the
informal sector. This occurs because the income effect of the rise in taxes is stronger than the
substitution effect; thus, the demand for both types of output falls, so the net output of both sectors
must fall in equilibrium. The net output of the formal sector falls simply because of the rise in the
piece removed by taxes; the net output of the informal sector must fall by a movement of wooers out
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of that sector back to the formal one. Thus, there is no 'Laffer curve,' and the government will
always wish to raise taxes a little bit more.
On the other hand, if the informal sector output is a very good substitute for the formal, unless
the level of public service is quite high workers will exit the formal sector en masse to avoid taxes,
in which case the marginal benefit of order (which is proportional to the size of the formal sector) is
below its marginal cost. Thus, it is not optimal to provide a moderate level of public services. The
graft-maximizing decision is either enough order to create a large formal sector, or a vanishingly small
level of services. In a sufficiently small economy, the former is not feasible.
Thus, in either case, if the economy is small, it falls into the 'black hole of graft,' despite the
presence of the informal sector. This line of argument may indeed help to explain cases like the
Zairian debacle, with very low levels of public service and high levels of graft, despite the presence
of the large informal sector into which any worker can exit at any time.
Smuggling and Black Markets.
In LDC's, indirect taxes are still disproportionately important in total revenue. Thus, an
important form of tax evasion remains the undeclared transaction, which can take the form of
smuggling to evade a trade tax, street vending or off-the-book sales to avoid sales taxes, or in general
operation in the 'informal,' 'black,' or 'second' economy.
Once again, we can think of two broad categories in which the relevant theory has been
developed. In the mainstream economic approach, 'informal' transactions have been regarded as a
constraint on the government. The theory was first explored for the case of smuggling, beginning
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with Bhagwati and Hansen (1973), who showed that smuggling could easily be incorporated into
standard trade theory models, and if it consumes real resources, its welfare effects are ambiguous
(since it can undo some of the inefficiency from a distortionary tariff, but introduce a new inefficiency
by using up additional resources). This led to a rich body of literature on the positive and normative
analysis of smuggling, including the widely cited Pitt (1981) model of legal trade as a camouflage for
illegal trade, and many others.
The other forms of indirect tax evasion have been more recently incorporated into theory.
Virmani (1989), for example, incorporates an evadable output tax into a model of firm behaviour.
If larger firms are more likely to be audited and caught in evasion, firms will operate below efficient
scale, which would not happen if the tax were not evadable. Gordon (1990) shows that in the case
of a retailer with market power, formal and informal sales can coexist, because a vendor can use the
option to evade the sales tax as a screening device. The point is that consumers differ in their
reservation prices and also in their aversion to the embarrassment of being caught in an illegal
transaction; if these two are positively correlated, the vendor can profitably offer to sell an item either
'for cash,' thus free of tax, or formally at a higher price. The price differential exceeds the tax, so the
mechanism allows the vendor to appropriate more of the consumer surplus from the high reservation
price type than would be possible otherwise. Das-Gupta and Gang (1995) analyze the enforcement
advantages of a VAT; in their model a VAT structure allows for complete tax enforcement with an
imperfect audit system, through cross-checking of the reports of buyers and sellers of intermediate
inputs. However, since this requires a sufficient frequency of audits, which may be costly, it may be
optimal to allow some evasion nonetheless, in which case the VAT will tend to distort input prices.
They thus simultaneously formalize and qualify the two most common arguments for VAT's in
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practice, their enforcement advantages and their non-distortionary treatment of intermediate inputs.
In addition, a literature has sprung up on the implications of informal transactions for optimal
taxation. Bhagwati and Srinivasan (1974) studied the optimal tariff in the presence of smuggling,
finding that with constant elasticity offer curves the optimal tariff is smaller with smuggling than
without, but in the more general case the effect is ambiguous. More recently, attempts have been
made to extend optimal indirect tax theory to settings in which informal transactions are possible6.
In this vein, Kaplow (1990) studies optimal indirect taxation and enforcement in a one-good
model of tax administration with and without costly evasion. He finds that the possibility of evasion
implies that less public good provision, but a higher tax rate, is optimal. Lovely (1995) studies the
first order conditions for the optimal commodity tax vector in a model with costly evasion, finding
that the usual Ramsey-rule logic applies without change, except that the relevant substitution
elasticities must be defined in terms of legal purchases only. Lovely (1994) finds that adding
Bhagwati-Hansen type smuggling to an economy in which the government chooses the optimal
indirect tax vector before and after smuggling is made possible must lower welfare; and studies the
welfare effects of tightening enforcement.
McLaren (1996) also analyzes the optimal structure of indirect taxes in the presence of the
possibility of black markets. In that model, it is possible for any vendor to evade sales tax, but there
is always a possibility that doing so will lead to detection and a fine. The probability of detection in
a given sector is determined by the number of inspectors the government has hired for that sector,
6The theory of optimal indirect taxes, as epitomized by Diamond and Mirrlees (1971), and the
related theory of indirect tax reform, have been broadly applied to LDC problems, most notably in
Newbery and Stern (ed.)(1987); and Ahmad and Stern (1991). However, research in this
tradition has for the most part not paid explicit attention to evadability.
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times the number of transactions each inspector can audit per period, divided by the volume of
transactions in that sector. Thus, the less of the good is sold, the more dangerous it is to evade the
tax on it: There is a 'market thinning' effect, which can lead to multiple equilibria if the tax is high
(if everyone evades, the price will be low, thus the volume will be high, thus evasion will be relatively
safe, and vice versa). If the government chooses its vector of tax rates and inspector forces for the
various goods optimally, it will hire just enough inspectors in each market to deter evasion. This
allows us to calculate the required number of inspectors in each market as a function of the tax
vector, and hence the 'enforcement cost' associated with a given tax vector, allowing us to reduce
the problem to the selection of a tax vector that raises the right amount of revenue while minimizing
the usual deadweight loss costs plus these additional enforcement costs. If the monitoring technology
is relatively effective, the latter costs will be unimportant, but with a poorly developed information
infrastructure, they could be much more important that the deadweight loss.
It turns out, somewhat surprisingly, that these enforcement costs have a tendency to be
concave in the tax vector. Intuitively, at the optimum, since evasion is just deterred, a high-tax sector
must also be a high-risk sector for evasion. Suppose that the demand for good i is perfectly inelastic
and cross-price elasticities are zero among goods with a positive tax. If evasion is just deterred, and
we increase the tax on good i from $1 to $1.01, raising the number of inspectors for good i just
enough so that evasion is still just deterred, then the probability of being caught at evasion must be
higher after the tax increase than it was before. But then if we raise the tax once more, to $ 1.02, it
will take a smaller increase in the good i inspection force to deter evasion: The second 10 increase
in the tax is less tempting to evaders than the first one, because it is associated with a higher risk to
evaders than the first one. Thus, because of the constraint that evasion must be just deterred at the
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optimum, there is a tendency for enforcement costs to be concave in the vector of tax rates. This
implies that where these enforcement costs are most important ~ in an economy with poorly
developed administration — the second order condition may fail, and the optimum may take the form
of maximal differentiation in tax rates across sectors. This leads to a theory of'cash cow' taxation
for poor economies, in which one sector is picked (at random, in a symmetric model) to carry the
burden of all of the taxation. Only when the economy crosses a certain threshold value in its
monitoring technology does it become optimal to tax all sectors. This can thus be taken to be a kind
of theory of abrupt tax reforms over the course of development.
All of the above work treats informal markets as a constraint on the government. As with the
case of corruption, there is also a contrarian view viewing it as a tool of government. Thus, Boone
(1994) shows that official toleration of smuggling in the 1980's by the Mourides and their allies was
away of assisting that powerful group in return for continued political support. Cross (1995, 1996)
shows that the government officially tolerated the street vendors in Mexico city, who flagrantly
evaded sales taxes, as part of an implicit political bargain that helped the PRI keep its electoral grip
on the city until the bargain came apart during the 1990's. Marcouiller and Young (1995) show that
if informal goods and formal goods are complements, government tolerance of the informal sector
may be useful in bolstering the official sector and thus maximizing graft.
A clever innovation in the empirics of smuggling has been presented by Dercon and Ayalew
(1995). They use the fact that even when data on smuggling quantities are unavailable, one can often
find a reasonable estimate of the prices smugglers face. Using this, perhaps one can estimate the
implicit response of smuggling to price incentives by estimating the response of officially recorded
export quantities to the smuggling price premium. The authors do this for coffee in the case of
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Ethiopia, estimating smuggling prices based on the world price, the black market exchange rate, and
an imputed smuggling marketting margin. They find a fairly low elasticity, 11%, of officially
marketted quantities to the smuggling price differential, and estimate on this basis that between 1976
and 1991, 10-15% of total output was smuggled. Although this approach suffers from all of the
difficulties faced in estimating agricultural supply functions7, it may be quite useful.
Finally, a very promising approach to the estimation of welfare effects of smuggling is
pioneered in Connolly, Devereux and Cortes (1995). They show that it is quite easy to use duality
theory to provide second-order approximations to the effect of smuggling on national income (in the
Bhagwati and Hansen (1973) sense: this is the general equilibrium effect of allowing smuggling,
holding trade policy constant). This can be calculated using data on tariffs, prices, and legal trade
volumes along with estimates of the volume of smuggling. They apply the technique to Paraguay,
which in the data year of 1990 had considerable import and export smuggling, and also transshipment
smuggling to Brazil and Argentina in evasion of those country's tariffs. Essentially the estimate of
the welfare effect is half of the profits from transshipment (gross of smuggling costs, which are
unobservable), plus the tariff revenues on that portion of illegal transshipments imported legally;
minus half of the tariff revenue lost from import and export smuggling. The authors find that national
income gained more from the transshipment smuggling than it lost from the other forms, and that the
net effect of smuggling was equivalent to about 2.1% of GDP.
7For example, the official prices faced by the farmers ideally would be thought of as jointly
determined with the quantities; the finances of the government are surely affected by the
fluctuations in the crop, and thus the implicit tax rate the government monopsony sets surely is as
well. However, in the absence of a good model of this process, and useful instruments, the
official prices are generally treated as exogenous. This is possibly the source of some very odd
results, such as the finding that the elasticity of coffee supply (with respect to the relative price of
coffee to alternative crops) is negative.
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As a word of conclusion, perhaps the main message of recent work is the value of a case-by-
case approach in policy analysis in these areas. If smuggling, for example, could be seen as having
been at some point an economic asset in Paraguay, a political tool in the Cote D'lvoire, and a
nuisance in many other places, it is unlikely that the same advice will be useful across the board. In
the same spirit, the value of additional econometric case studies could be quite high.
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